

IRAN'S POLICIES DURING \WORLD WAR II

of all in- and out-going passengers was in the hands of the occupying powers.

On January 29, 1942, this *de facto* situation was confirmed by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Iran. Britain and Russia undertook to defend Iran from aggression on the part of Germany or any other power. They pledged to "respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran" and promised to withdraw their forces "from Iranian Territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended." Britain and Russia engaged themselves to "safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war" and not "to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty." In return Iran undertook to cooperate with the Allies. It was understood, however, that assistance of her army was to be "limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory." Iran promised the Allies free passage and facilities, including recruitment of labor. A censorship that would apply to all communications was also provided for. The Allies were permitted to maintain military forces on the territory of Iran with the understanding that their presence would not constitute a military occupation and would disturb as little as possible the administration and economic life of the country.²

The treaty was signed on behalf of Iran by Premier Ali Soheily, who had succeeded Furuqi in office and who continued his conciliatory pro-Allies policy. He was replaced later in 1942

by Qavam
Saltaneh, only to reappear on the political scene at
the beginning
of 1943. The sudden catapulting of Iran from a
markedly pro-
German attitude into the Soviet-British alliance was
accomplished
smoothly but not without some tension. In fact,
many Iranians
deeply resented the occupation of their country by
two traditional
enemies. Some were convinced of ultimate German
victory, and a
number were ready to continue their clandestine
work in favor of
the Nazis. Others masked their true feelings and
pretended to be
pro-Ally. With the exception of some radical elements,
the majority

2 For the full text see Appendix no. II.